Erdogan’s susceptibility was highly predictable, though. In
his hands, Turkish terror laws and legal mechanisms in general have proved a highly
effective tool to crush dissent and marginalize opponents. In a secret ballot on
May 17th, 348 members of the Turkish parliament endorsed a constitutional
change that would strip parliament
members who are currently under investigation of their immunity from
prosecution, a measure that is widely expected to be exploited to target 100 deputies from the pro-Kurdish HDP and from the traditional
opposition party, the CHP.
The ruling party has failed to secure the 367 necessary votes to exclude a
referendum, yet it is highly concerning that the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) rallied behind such a divisive will after Erdogan publicly called
for HDP affiliates to face prosecution for their alleged ties with the outlawed
Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK).
Davutoglu’s Departure
Brings About Further Unbalance
Overall, the past few weeks offer a precious insight into how
Turkey will look in the coming months. Now that Ahmet
Davutoglu is out of the picture, the country may adopt a much more
confrontational stance towards Western powers while embracing a more cooperative
attitude towards its Eastern neighbors, especially Qatar.
Davutoglu was at once – and not coincidentally – Erdogan’s
closest ally, the AKP Secretary General, and Turkey’s Prime Minister. After
months of fluctuating tension with Erdogan on matters of presidential
powers, economic policies and pretrial detention for alleged dissidents, he
announced that he will step down after the May 22 extraordinary AKP meeting at
the request of the President, and promised that he will not run for office
again.
The positive perception of Davutoglu among Western powers
may have served as a catalyst for his political marginalization. Davutoglu was widely
regarded as “a
voice of sobriety” in the Turkish government and the ultimate bastion
against Turkey’s march
to autocracy. An expert diplomat and respected intellectual, Davutoglu has
a long history of close cooperation with the European and American authorities.
He served and supported Erdogan’s concept of Turkey’s foreign policy first as
Erdogan’s chief political adviser and then as his Foreign Minister in 2009. The
President’s most recent electoral triumph in November 2015 is largely ascribed
to his partnership with Davutoglu, his Prime Minister since August 2014.
With his trusted ally and sole counterpoint out of the way,
Erdogan will see no obstacles to maintain an even harder line against the PKK
and to advocate Turkish nationalism against the Kurdish minority, a dynamic
that is likely to escalate tensions with Washington. The Ankara-based Economic Policy Research Foundation
analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan posited that Erdogan’s anti-Kurdish resolve may be
dictated by electoral concerns translated into a strategy
to win the nationalist constituency and their backing for a new
constitution that will expand the presidential role. Ozcan’s point suggests
that Ankara’s resistance to Washington’s support for the Democratic Union Party
(PYD) of the Syrian Kurds in Iraq and Syria may grow increasingly problematic in the long run between the two
countries.
In fact, Washington has heavily relied on the Democratic
Union Party (PYD) of the Syrian Kurds as a credible
ground force against ISIS since they
secured control over Kobani in early 2015. U.S. authorities have recently announced
additional support for PYD with 250 additional troops on the ground. Hurriyet columnist Verda Ozer reports
that the U.S. has a major
operation in store in northern Syria between Azez and Jarablus that
envisions the PYD as the main ground force. However, the PYD’s connection with
the PKK has complicated internal dynamics within the U.S.-led coalition in
Syria and Iraq, especially since the U.S. appears to be actively supporting
forces that Turkish authorities perceive as a national
security threat.
A Shared Vision
Over the past few years, an increasingly disenchanted Turkey
has become less and less reliant on its alliance with Western powers in matters
of regional and international status and military defense. A perceived U.S.
disengagement from the Gulf and its own ambition for greater regional
prominence induced Turkey to seek to “diversify
its potential allies”. In fact, the country has greatly
expanded its economic and military ties with its Arab neighbors since 2008.
Turkey’s military base in Qatar, inaugurated on May 10th,
assumes an even stronger symbolic relevance now that Davutoglu is gone. The
base constitutes Turkey’s first military installation in the Middle East, and is
expected to host three thousand troops which will be supported by aerial and
naval assets, military trainers, and special operation forces. It signals that
Turkey’s Eastern neighbors have gained new strategic relevance for the
country’s foreign policy outlook. It also officially ratifies Turkey’s
commitment to a long term partnership with Qatar based on a joint
vision and in the face of common threats to the Gulf and the Middle East
writ large.
Qatar and Turkey’s foreign policy priorities have substantially
overlapped in the Syrian, Yemeni, and Libyan scenario since the Arab Spring,
but their rapprochement was strategically consolidated through key political
and military initiatives. In January 2015, the two governments established a
high-level cooperation council to foster closer political and economic ties. The two countries signed sixteen separate agreements in the field of education, science, finance, commerce, and
security, and a declaration of
intent involving the bilateral lifting of visa requirements for citizens of
both countries. Erdogan
even recently received an honorary doctoral degree from Qatar University. Last
month Qatar National Bank (QNB), the largest lender in
the Middle East and Africa by assets, received the approval of Qatar's central bank
and Turkey's Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency to acquire Turkey's
Finansbank, the Gulf Arab region's largest lender, from National Bank of Greece
for 2.7 billion euros ($3.08 billion).
However, Qatar and Turkey’s commitment to the Islamist cause
runs deeper than their recent political, military and financial partnership. Since the early 2000s, Qatar and
Turkey have devoted significant energies and funds to supporting Islamist
parties in the Middle East. Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular rank
among the primary beneficiaries of both countries. Both Qatar and Turkey have historically
hosted Hamas’s ruling branches and prominent affiliates, and have a long track
record of financial and political support to the terrorist organization,
especially in Gaza, to the detriment of the Palestinian Authority. Both have boosted
the Muslim Brotherhood’s political ascent in Egypt with the election of Mohamed
Morsi, and saw their ties with the country deteriorate after Sisi’s military
coup. Qatar has exerted a quasi-formal patronage over the Muslim Brotherhood
worldwide and has supported affiliated Islamist factions in Syria and Libya.
But so has Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, which has played a mediating
role between the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and the Assad regime since 2006.
Minarets and Power
Projections
Interestingly, a certain resonance can be inferred in
another, unconventional profile of both countries’ foreign policy – a shared
endeavor that The Economist labelled
“religious
diplomacy”. Qatar is committed to export Salafism and win influence across
the globe since the late 1970s, primarily by funding
mosques and cultural institutions. Although more recently, Turkey boasts a
respectable record of mosques and schools sponsorship as well.
According to Turkish official records, the state-controlled
Ministry of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has bankrolled projects for the
construction of schools
and over 100 mosques in more than 25 countries – five mosques in 2015 alone.
The Times revealed that ten
new mosques are currently in the planning stages,
including one in Cambridge for which Turkey has reportedly disbursed £17 million
(about $24.5 million). The minarets of Tirana’s mega-mosque – the
largest mosque in the Balkans – and the brand new mosque in Lanham, Maryland,
recently inaugurated by Erdogan himself, have made the news as the most
spectacular accomplishments of Erdogan’s mosque program.
The tones of the Qatari Wahhabism are substantially
different from Turkey’s Sufi Islam, yet the rationale of the Erdogan
administration’s investments in mosques and school sponsorship seems to align
with Qatar’s. As confirmed by a recent report on the 900
German mosques allegedly controlled by Turkey, Turkey has joined the race
for political and cultural influence beyond its borders by seeking to control
education and religious sites in several countries.
What’s on Turkey’s
Horizon
Davutoglu leaves behind a country visibly headed for an
authoritarian devolution, whose president is even willing to offer a new
opportunity for political prominence to the same military that he had aggressively
prosecuted
for decades. Yet, from Turkey’s mosques program to his plan for
reengagement of its Middle Eastern neighbors, Erdogan has always been the final
decision maker in Turkey’s foreign policy since his rise to political power in
2002 and Davutoglu’s departure is not expected to change this. Moreover, the
current Transport, Maritime
Affairs and Communications Minister, Binali Yildirim, who will officially
take power next week as the new AKP leader and Turkey’s Prime Minister, has
already declared that he will
work in total harmony with the President.
If Davutoglu’s resignation marks the final chapter of
Turkey’s hopeless ambition for EU membership, no major evolution should be
expected in the country’s relations with the United States. Many experts have
remarked that Turkey still needs the U.S. to serve as its military
and political guarantor. What, instead, should be expected is Turkey’s reinvigorated
cooperation with Qatar and its Arab neighbors.
Turkey’s new permanent presence on the Qatari territory
through the new military base will be mutually expendable. Qatar, on the one
hand, will be reinforced in terms of security measures the country is
implementing for the 2022 World Cup and in its own autonomy – underwritten by
Turkey – especially in light of its tense relations with both Saudi Arabia and
Iran. Turkey, on the other
hand, will play the role of a more valuable interlocutor both to the Gulf countries and to the United States. Their
common friends –
from Islamists to extremist factions and terrorist groups – are likely to
benefit from this consolidated axis.
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