Not a word was proffered by
Qatari authorities after the past two weeks’ media frenzy over Clinton’s
leaked emails to her campaign manager John Podesta that brought the thorny
issue of Qatar’s support for extremism in the Middle East back into the public
eye. Their U.S. allies, on the other hand, felt that it was time for grandiose
gestures and public appreciation. Yesterday, Assistant Secretary for the Department of the U.S. Treasury Daniel
Glaser flew to Qatar to meet with senior Qatari leaders and to stress that the U.S. values their
partnership regardless of the magnitude
of Qatar’s past and enduring efforts to advance radicalism in the region and
across the globe.
Maybe the timing of the leak was the key to Qatar’s silence. WikiLeaks
released Clinton’s emails shortly after Qatar Airways announced their $11.7
billion order of 40 jets from U.S. manufacturer Boeing. The air company also committed to an
additional order of 60 Boeing 737 Max
8 worth $6.9 billion, and seems intentioned to explore the purchase of 30
Boeing 787-9 Dreamliners, of 10 777-300ERs, as well as of single-aisle planes
potentially replacing Airbus Group-supplied aircraft. Long
stalled by the White House
over concerns that the sale could erode Israel’s “qualitative military edge”
and provide new weapons to states with controversial counterterrorism records,
the deal reasserted and reinforced economic and military ties between the U.S.
and Qatar beyond political and humanitarian concerns. After all, Qatar hosts the
largest U.S. airbase outside American territories and remains a decisive
partner for all U.S.’s
efforts against ISIS.
It is hard, however, to accurately weigh strategic considerations
against the positive impact of effective lobbying when it comes to the U.S.’s
willingness to turn a blind eye to Qatar’s support for radical groups across
the Middle East. As Al-Monitor columnist
Julian Pecquet recently reported,
Qatar has greatly expanded “its stable of lobbying and public relations
firms from two to five in 2015 and paid them a combined $3.34 million, according to a review of financial
disclosures.” Pecquet further observed, however, that conspicuous donations
devolved in support of education and humanitarian aid across the globe have yet
failed to get Qatar the reputation it has so determinedly sought to achieve. In
both fields, the real intentions behind Qatar’s generosity have ultimately surfaced.
If it has been hard for Qatar to reconcile
its dedication to the humanitarian cause with its longstanding support for extremism and
terrorism in the Middle East, it has been even harder for those
countries who have received Qatar’s funds to publicly justify their passive or welcoming attitude towards the
emirate’s donations.
By heavily investing in the construction and restoration of mosques
and Islamic educative institutions promoting Salafi teachings, Qatar has
secured enclaves of acquiescence – if not consensus – towards its agenda worldwide.
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow David Weinberg reiterated yesterday in a column posted by The Weekly Standard that Salafi
proselytization must be acknowledged as one of
the central causes leading people to join the ranks of terrorist and extremists
groups. Salafism’s “dehumanizing rejection of religious pluralism” is relevant
to ISIS and al-Qaeda’s core beliefs just as much as the Muslim Brotherhood’s
“absolute Islamism and bid to topple existing regimes”, Weinberg stressed.
Yet, faced with the event of Qatar – a Salafi/Wahhabi state and a
longstanding patron of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood – growing resentful
over an indirect, public acknowledgment
of the emirate’s terror financing efforts by U.S. authorities, the U.S. Treasury emissary flew to Qatar to reinvigorate
the alliance. According to the
statement released by the U.S. Embassy, Daniel Glaser met with Qatari Prime
Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser to discuss “the Government of
Qatar's recent positive efforts to counter terrorist financing” and to reiterate the U.S.’s support for
Qatari initiatives to prevent terror financiers from accessing its financial
system.
The Obama administration
repeatedly came under strong criticism over the past years for its alliance
with Qatar, and the strategic goals it serves do not make it less concerning. Qatar
may be keeping Boeing in business and guaranteeing the U.S.’s continuing,
sovereign presence at the Al-Udeid airbase, but ten years from now the American
commitment to this axis may be regarded as one of the most myopic strategies
ever pursued by the Obama administration.