The world, it seems, just can’t turn down the chance
to reach into Qatar’s deep pockets. An ambitious Qatari foreign policy agenda,
far outweighing the size of the country’s territory or population, has alienated
and enraged leaders from Moscow to Washington D.C. And while this agenda has
left Qatar on
the sidelines of the power structure determining
Syria’s future, the leaders of the small Gulf country have worked tirelessly to
finalize deals around the globe with clear geopolitical implications. Doha has
funneled billions into major investments and military equipment as the
country’s leaders seek to become an increasingly relevant and militarily potent
member of the international community.
Today, it seems fairly certain that Qatar, along
with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the U.S., chose the losing side in a Syrian Civil
War that has increasingly come to resemble a proxy war. But unlike Turkey,
Qatar has so far failed to reposition
itself in order to ensure
its place at a negotiating table dominated by the Kremlin.
With the power of its proxy forces in Syria fading and with few avenues to
regain its status as a deciding player in Syria’s future, Qatar’s preference
for tapping its billion dollar coffers to buy global influence makes all the
more sense. In an international power structure characterized by the strained
relations of the world’s superpowers and their global standoffs, of military or
political nature, Qatar has the money that everyone wants.
While Doha has frustrated
officials in Washington D.C. over the country’s alleged
support of rebel Islamists in Syria and its reluctance to block
its citizens from financing
terrorist groups, Qatar has spent billions on U.S.
military equipment, bolstering the private U.S. military industry, while
allowing the country to gain important defense materials. Just over a month
ago, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced that the U.S. had reached
an agreement with Qatar for the sale of an AN/FPS-132
radar missile warning and space surveillance system to Qatar. The radar system,
which Carter stated “would mitigate the threat from Iranian ballistic
missiles”, produced by Raytheon was estimated to cost over
a billion dollars after Qatar’s July 2013 request. In late 2014, Raytheon won a $2.4
billion contract to construct an Air and Missile Defense
Operations Center (ADOC) for the state of Qatar and, more recently, the State
Department approved a $21.1
billion sale of F-15QA fighter jets to Qatar.
Yet, Qatar’s growing ties with the U.S. are not
limited to military purchases. In August, the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA),
the country’s sovereign wealth fund, invested
$622 million in stake in the iconic Empire State Building
while slowly
acquiring valuable
real
estate
across the country. By 2015, QIA had opened its own office in New York and announced
its plans to invest $35 billion in the U.S. by 2020. In 2016,
according to Real Capital Analytics Inc., QIA listed as fourth
on the list of the largest investors in U.S. office space. Likely
eager to continue to attract billion dollar military sales and investments in
U.S. infrastructure, Qatari money flowing into the U.S. can buy influence in a
new, long-term approach far from the battlefields in Syria and Yemen.
So far, Turkey has emerged as the strongest rebel-supporter
to join in the circle of powers determining Syria’s fate, a role that looks set
to be consolidated by joint efforts in the wake of the assassination of Andrey
Karlov, the late Russian ambassador to Turkey, rather than weakened. Leaders in
Doha, who have seen their influence in the Syrian war dwindle, have reached for
their pockets to buy clout in Ankara, also. Aside from the outspoken Qatari
post-coup-attempt solidarity with President Erdogan
and the December “Supreme
Strategic Committee” meeting between Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin
Hamad al-Thani and President Erdogan, Turkey has also become a prime benefactor
of Qatari military spending.
Last week, reports
emerged that Turkey’s military software company Havelsan
had built and sent an AgustaWestland AW139 flight simulator to the Qatari
military. Less than a week before news of the Havelsan deal broke, Turkish
subsidiary RBSS, a joint effort with German and Malaysian manufacturers, was
reported to be in talks with Doha over the production and
sale of 1,000 armed vehicles to the Gulf country. Talks of a deal of this size
come as little surprise since Qatar owns a 50
percent stake in RBSS’ Turkish partner and one of
Turkey’s largest vehicle manufacturers, BMC.
While Qatar has endeavored to strengthen the ties of
American and Turkish interests to Qatar’s money, the recent purchase
of a 19.5 percent stake in Rosneft, Russia’s state-owned
oil company, alongside Glencore stands out as the country’s boldest recent move
in a policy of geo-economic statecraft. While questions remain over Qatar’s
willingness to use its partial ownership of Rosneft for political gain, the
acquisition could give Qatar unique leverage in cash-strapped Moscow.
As their control on events in Syria has gradually
weakened, Qatari leaders have quietly accelerated a strategy of buying
influence while stockpiling expensive and dynamic military equipment and
systems. Having clearly demonstrated their interests by financing
Muslim Brotherhood leader-turned-president Mohamed Morsi,
bankrolling shady
charitable organizations and arming
dangerous rebel groups, countries on the receiving end of
Qatari investments should heed the unmistakable potential costs of trading
influence for Qatari money.